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One	  vexing	  problem	  that	  many	  researchers	  face	  when	  attempting	  to	  publish	  their	  research	  
in	  prominent,	  peer-­‐reviewed	  scientific	  journals	  is	  that	  data	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  published	  
when	  they	  reveal	  statistically	  significant	  than	  non-­‐significant	  findings.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  point	  to	  
publishing	  research	  is	  often	  the	  pitting	  of	  theories	  against	  each	  other	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  
which	  one	  provides	  a	  better	  account	  of	  phenomena	  under	  investigation.	  	  If	  the	  findings	  do	  
not	  differentiate	  among	  theoretical	  accounts,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  statistical	  significance,	  
then,	  it	  can	  be	  argued,	  there	  is	  no	  advance	  in	  science.	  	  Thus,	  manuscripts	  in	  which	  data	  
analyses	  have	  led	  to	  failures	  to	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  are	  routinely	  excised	  from	  many	  
top	  scientific	  publications,	  perhaps	  in	  large	  measure	  because	  of	  the	  inherent	  ambiguity	  in	  
interpreting	  such	  outcomes.	  	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  consequences	  associated	  with	  this	  model	  of	  publishing.	  	  For	  
example,	  when	  only	  statistically	  significant	  findings	  are	  being	  published,	  the	  phenomenon	  
under	  study	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  important	  one	  given	  the	  apparent	  replicability	  
of	  the	  outcome	  in	  the	  scientific	  literature.	  	  That	  is,	  as	  failures	  to	  replicate	  are	  not	  being	  
published,	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question	  appears	  to	  be	  quite	  robust.	  	  A	  corollary	  to	  this	  
illusory	  robustness	  is	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  the	  “file-­‐drawer”	  problem	  or	  publication	  bias.	  	  
Simply	  put,	  failures	  to	  replicate	  well-­‐established	  effects	  go	  unnoticed	  in	  a	  scientific	  discipline	  
because	  they	  go	  unpublished,	  remaining	  silent	  in	  laboratory	  file	  cabinets.	  	  The	  important	  
issue	  here	  is	  that	  if	  there	  are	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  failures	  to	  replicate	  that	  do	  not	  receive	  
scientific	  attention,	  then	  studies	  that	  have	  found	  a	  particular	  effect	  become	  just	  the	  “tip-­‐of-­‐
the-­‐iceberg,”	  painting	  a	  skewed	  and	  unbalanced	  picture	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  true	  effect	  in	  
the	  population.	  	  This	  might	  even	  occur	  when	  such	  failures	  have	  adhered	  to	  the	  same	  
methodology	  as	  previously	  published	  studies.	  	  Thus,	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  our	  own,	  as	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scientists	  we	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  real	  and	  robust,	  simply	  because	  we	  are	  
not	  privy	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  replication	  failures.	  
Not	  to	  put	  too	  fine	  a	  point	  on	  this,	  but	  failures	  to	  replicate	  well-­‐known	  psychological	  
phenomena	  have	  drawn	  considerable	  attention	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  This	  interest	  has	  been	  part	  
of	  a	  wider	  movement	  called	  Open	  Science	  that	  strives	  for	  more	  transparency	  in	  scientific	  
research.	  	  An	  important	  issue	  of	  Open	  Science	  is	  that	  more	  emphasis	  and	  value	  should	  be	  
given	  to	  conducting	  replication	  studies	  as	  such	  studies	  might	  clarify	  the	  reliability	  of	  
scientific	  phenomena.	  	  For	  example,	  attempts	  to	  replicate	  100	  published	  effects	  resulted	  in	  
only	  a	  small	  minority	  (39%)	  of	  successes	  (Open	  Science	  Collaboration,	  2015).	  	  Similarly,	  
attempts	  to	  replicate	  21	  experiments	  that	  were	  previously	  published	  in	  Nature	  and	  Science,	  
resulted	  in	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  these	  attempts	  failing	  (Camerer	  et	  al.,	  2018).	  	  Although	  it	  is	  
well	  known	  that	  replication	  efforts	  can	  fail	  for	  any	  number	  of	  reasons	  unrelated	  to	  the	  
phenomena	  under	  study	  (e.g.,	  simply	  a	  Type	  II	  error),	  many	  have	  focussed	  on	  potential	  
methodological	  and	  statistical	  practices	  in	  the	  original	  research	  (e.g.,	  low	  power,	  p-­‐hacking).	  	  
Indeed,	  many	  researchers	  have	  made	  an	  urgent	  plea	  for	  methodological	  and	  statistical	  
reform	  to	  these	  practices,	  ones	  that,	  it	  is	  argued,	  should	  make	  psychological	  science	  more	  
replicable	  (e.g.,	  Bishop,	  2020;	  Chambers,	  2017;	  Nelson,	  Simmons,	  &	  Simonsohn,	  2018;	  
Otgaar,	  Sagana,	  &	  Tupper,	  2020).	  	  
Of	  course,	  attempts	  to	  replicate	  previous	  findings	  must	  have	  an	  impeccable	  set	  of	  
standards	  for	  methodological	  and	  statistical	  rigor,	  perhaps	  even	  greater	  than	  those	  original	  
studies	  that	  the	  replications	  are	  based	  on	  (e.g.,	  McShane,	  Tackett,	  Böckenholt,	  &	  Gelman,	  
2019).	  	  However,	  the	  problem	  remains	  that	  if	  we	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  these	  failed	  
replications,	  attempts	  at	  meta-­‐analyses	  are	  doomed	  to	  failure	  because	  the	  research	  that	  
does	  get	  published	  presents	  an	  incomplete	  picture	  of	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	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interest.	  	  This	  problem	  can	  be	  circumvented	  in	  meta-­‐analyses	  if	  researchers	  are	  willing	  to	  
share	  what	  is	  in	  their	  “file-­‐drawer.”	  	  Although	  this	  can	  ameliorate	  this	  problem	  to	  some	  
extent,	  perhaps	  with	  the	  resurgence	  of	  analyses	  that	  improve	  inferences	  about	  null	  effects	  
(e.g.,	  Bayesian	  inference,	  see	  Wagenmakers	  et	  al.,	  2018;	  equivalence	  testing,	  Lakens	  et	  al.,	  
2020),	  it	  may	  now	  be	  prudent	  to	  invite	  researchers	  to	  contribute	  well-­‐controlled	  
experiments	  that	  fail	  to	  replicate	  well-­‐known	  effects	  to	  the	  memory	  literature.	  
To	  this	  end,	  the	  editors	  of	  Memory	  welcome	  contributions	  to	  the	  journal	  that	  fail	  to	  
replicate	  well-­‐known	  effects	  in	  the	  memory	  literature.	  	  This	  initiative	  builds	  on	  another	  
recent	  change	  in	  Memory	  where	  we	  have	  encouraged	  researchers	  to	  preregister	  their	  work	  
using	  our	  Registered	  Reports	  facility.	  	  To	  kick	  off	  this	  “celebration”	  of	  all	  research	  that	  is	  
memory	  related,	  whether	  the	  findings	  are	  or	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  the	  traditional	  
sense	  (for	  an	  interesting	  analysis	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  traditional	  statistical	  significance,	  see	  
Amrhein,	  Greenland,	  &	  McShane,	  2019),	  we	  present	  four	  papers	  in	  which	  attempts	  to	  
replicate	  well-­‐known	  memory	  phenomena	  came	  up	  with	  null	  results.	  	  In	  the	  article	  by	  Howe,	  
Akhtar,	  Bland,	  and	  Hellenthal	  (2020),	  the	  effects	  of	  aging	  on	  interference	  and	  
reconsolidation	  are	  examined	  in	  episodic	  memory.	  	  Although	  as	  expected	  older	  adults	  took	  
longer	  to	  learn	  than	  younger	  adults	  when	  asked	  to	  complete	  an	  episodic	  memory	  task,	  
there	  were	  no	  interference	  or	  reconsolidation	  effects	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  memory	  
reactivation	  for	  either	  age	  group.	  	  In	  the	  article	  by	  Taylor,	  Sanson,	  Burnell,	  Wade,	  and	  Garry	  
(2020)	  the	  promising	  effects	  of	  font	  type	  (Sans	  Forgetica)	  on	  memory	  were	  examined	  in	  four	  
experiments.	  	  Although	  participants	  rated	  this	  new	  font	  as	  more	  difficult	  to	  read	  than	  Arial	  
(where	  this	  increased	  difficulty	  was	  touted	  as	  leading	  to	  increased	  memorability),	  the	  use	  of	  
Sans	  Forgetica	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  improvements	  in	  memory	  performance.	  	  Aust	  and	  Stahl	  
(2020)	  examined	  the	  purported	  mnemonic	  effects	  of	  caffeine	  and	  found	  that	  there	  were	  no	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memory	  performance	  advantages	  as	  a	  function	  of	  caffeine	  dosing.	  	  Finally,	  Wessel,	  Albers,	  
Zandstra,	  and	  Heininga	  (2020)	  examined	  memory	  suppression	  effects	  in	  the	  think/no-­‐think	  
paradigm.	  	  The	  pattern	  of	  outcomes	  using	  both	  published	  and	  unpublished	  research	  raises	  
serious	  questions	  concerning	  memory	  inhibition	  theory	  and	  its	  suggestion	  that	  repression	  
represents	  a	  viable	  mechanism	  that	  underlies	  forgetting.	  
We	  hope	  that	  these	  articles	  are	  not	  only	  of	  interest	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  but	  also	  
that	  it	  tempts	  you	  to	  examine	  your	  backlog	  of	  “file	  drawer”	  data.	  	  If	  you	  do	  have	  a	  series	  of	  
studies	  that	  have	  failed	  to	  replicate	  well-­‐known	  memory	  phenomena,	  and	  they	  are	  
rigorously	  controlled	  methodologically	  and	  statistically	  analysed	  using	  techniques	  designed	  
to	  investigate	  null	  hypothesis	  effects,	  then	  we	  welcome	  such	  submissions.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  
hope	  that	  the	  journal	  Memory	  will	  be	  able	  to	  give	  researchers	  a	  more	  complete	  
understanding	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  memory	  research.	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